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STATEMENT OF THE CA SE
Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins has sued Price Waterhouse
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C.

§

2000e et seq., alleging that Price Waterhouse

intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex by
not admitting her as a partner of the firm.
challenges two decisions:

She essentially

the first by the members of the

Policy Board of Price Waterhouse to plac e her candidacy on
"hold" in March 1983, and the second by the partners in the
Price Waterhouse Office of Government Services ("OGS"), the
office in which plaintiff was employed, not to propose her for
the next admissions cycle, which began in August 1983.Ll_/
At trial, plaintiff satisfied her burden of
establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination, and
Price Waterhouse articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason as to each of the decisions, and thus has carried its
burden of production under the analysis set forth in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

Plaintiff resigned her employment with Price Waterhouse in
January 1984. Although she alleged in her Complaint that Price
Waterhouse subjected her to retaliation and constructive
discharge, and continued to retaliate against her after her
"constructive discharge," she abandoned these charges at
Thus, the only remedy to which plaintiff might be
trial.
entitled should she prevail on the merits would be backpay
limited to the period ending with the date of her resignation.
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66
n.8 (5th Cir. 1980); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509
F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).

l/

~

252-56 (1981) .

The issue before the Court therefore is whether

plaintiff has demonstrated that the reasons articulated by
Price Waterhouse were not the true reasons underlying these
decisions and thus has satisfied her ultimate burden of
persuading the Court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.

Id. at 256.

As is explained in full below, plaintiff simply has not met
this burden.
ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons Articulated
By Price Waterhouse For The "Hold" Decision Were
Pretextual.
The decision by the Policy Board to place plaintiff's

candidacy on hold was based on concerns expressed by Price
Waterhouse partners concerning her interpersonal skills; that
is, her relations and manner of dealing with others within the
firm.

These concerns were evident upon review of the long and

short form commentary, and Admissions Committee memoranda
concerning interviews with individual partners.

Thus, the

Admissions Committee recommended, and the Policy Board
concluded, that plaintiff's candidacy should be held at least a
year in order to see if plaintiff could improve her
interpersonal skills.

Thus, Price Waterhouse has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Policy Board's
1983 "hold" decision through the introduction of the long and
short forms, office visit memoranda, Admissions Committee
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recommendation, notes of the Policy Board discussion and the
testimony of Joseph Connor, Donald Ziegler, and Roger
Marcellin, and has carried its burden of production.

Plaintiff

has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the
articulated reasons are pretextual, and accordingly has failed
to satisfy her ultimate burden of persuading the Court that she
was the victim of intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex.

Price Waterhouse therefore is entitled to judgment in its

favor concerning this decision.
A.

Price Waterhouse Examines The Interpersonal Skills Of
Every Candidate For Admission.
It is undisputed that the category of interpersonal

skills is examined routinely both before and during the
admissions process with respect to all candidates, male and
female.

Over the course of their careers at Price Waterhouse,

employees are periodically evaluated concerning such
characteristics as poise, tact, personality, acceptance by
others, and interpersonal skills with respect to associates.
(Defendant's Exhs. 6 & 25)

After candidates are proposed, the

firm requests partners who have had substantial contact with
them to rate them on acceptance by partners, staff and clients,
tolerance, maturity and poise, sensitivity and tact,
adaptability and sense pf humor on the long-form evaluation.
(Defendant's Exh. 21)

Partners with less contact evaluate the

candidates' poise, authority and maturity, and congeniality on
the short-form evaluation.

(Defendant's Exh. 22)
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Such considerations have been recognized as valid
criteria in evaluating candidates for supervisory positions.
See Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Department, 717 F.2d 263
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1687 (1984); Burrus
v. United Telephone Co., 683 F . 2d 339 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446
(9th Cir. 1976); Nance v. Union Carbide Co., 540 F.2d 718 (4th
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 952
(1977); Faulkenheiner v. Legal Aid Society, 471 F . . Supp. 429
(M.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1980).
Examination of such factors is especially critical in the
evaluation of partnership candidates because of the degree of
professional autonomy accorded partners.
In addition, the partners often provide written
commentary on candidates' interpersonal skills in response to
the open-ended questions that are set forth at the end of the
long and short forms.

Virtually every candidate for admission

from 1982 through 1984 received some written commentary
concerning his or her interpersonal skills.
Exh. 68)

(Defendant's

Furthermore, the partners who commented upon

plaintiff's interpersonal skills routinely commented about the
interpersonal skills of male candidates, sometimes using the
same adjectives as those found in plaintiff's long- and
short-form comments.

(Defendant's Exh. 74)

The Admissions Committee often cites such commentary
in the memoranda that accompany its ''hold" and "no"
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recommendations to the Policy Board.

The record shows that

Admissions Committee references to interpersonal skills in this
context began well before plaintiff's candidacy, continued
through the year of her candidacy with respect to other
candidates, and appeared in the next year's recommendations as
well.

(Defendant's Exh. 64) Thus, the evidence shows that

interpersonal skills are regularly and routinely examined by
the firm with respect to all candidates.
B.

The Commentary Concerning Plaintiff's Interpersonal
Skills Had A Factual Basis.
The record before the Court reveals that there is no

serious dispute between the parties as to the factual basis for
the commentary concerning plaintiff's interpersonal skills.
Plaintiff's own testimony establishes that she was aware of her
difficulties in dealing with Price Waterhouse partners and
staff, and this testimony is corroborated by the business
records and other testimony before the Court.
1.

Plaintiff's Own Testimony Corroborates The
Factual Basis For Commentary Concerning Her
Interpersonal Skills.
Although plaintiff now apparently argues that

there was no factual basis for the concerns expressed about her
interpersonal skills,

(Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact

("Plaintiff's Findings") 26-37), she cannot seriously dispute
that she had difficulties in her relations with Price
Waterhouse partners and staff in light of her testimony before

s

She denied in her early testimony that anyone had

this Court.

spoken to her about difficulties in this area,

(R. 21 & 36) ,

but the balance of her testimony, both upon direct and
cross-examination, squarely contradicts this assertion.

Thus,

not only does her testimony confirm her interpersonal skills
deficiencies, but it also raises serious questions as to her
credibility.
Plaintiff directly contradicted herself by
admitting eventually that three OGS partners spoke . to her about
improving her interpersonal skills,

(R. 122), and that she

received notice of such problems in performance evaluations and
counseling sessions.

(R. 52)

Her testimony further

corroborates that she had problems in her dealings with both
partners and staff. As to her dealings with partners, plaintiff
stated that she was difficult to work with and had acted like a
"bitch" on the FMS project towards OGS partner Benton Warder.
( R. 107-08; Deposition of Ann Hopkins (Vol.
at 74-75)

I) ( "Hopkins Dep. ")

In addition, she described her disagreements with

Norman Statland, the National Director of Electronic Data
Processing, as strong and violent.

( R.

85)

As to her relations with Price Waterhouse staff,
plaintiff admitted to difficulties with Thomas Colberg and the
staff in St. Louis.

(R. 19, 67 & 125)

She also stated that

many of the staff difficulties described by partners in the
long and short forms had been conveyed to these partners either
directly or indirectly by OGS and St. Louis staff members.
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(R.

126

&

131-32)

Such comments are hardly surprising in light of

plaintiff's own description of the working conditions on her
projects.

She painted a picture of squabbles, shouting,

disagreements, short tempers and tension on every project in
which she was involved at Price Wat e rhouse.

(R . 21 & 34)

Thus, plaintiff's testimony fully corroborates her difficulties
in interpersonal dealings with Price Waterhouse partners and
staff.
2.

Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are
Corroborated By Performance Evaluations And
Counseling Session Notes.
Plaintiff's difficulties in the area of

interpersonal skills are documented in her performance
evaluations and counseling session notes that are before the
Court.

As early as 1980, plaintiff's need to improve her

interpersonal skills was noted in a performance evaluation.
(Defendant's Exh. 7)

Such references appeared regularly

through the fall of 1982.
25 & 26)

(Defendant's Exhs. 13, 14, 15, 24,

In addition, partners' notes of counseling sessions

record discussions with plaintiff concerning difficulties in
interpersonal skills, as well as her agreement that some people
believed that she was hard to work with, that she was overly
assertive, that she needed to be more tolerant and p atient, and
that dealing effectively and motivationally with staff was her
primary weakness .

(Defendant's Exhs. 11, 17 & 25)
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Faced with this documentary evidence, plaintiff
does not dispute that she was counseled concerning her
relations and dealings with others.

Instead, she claims that

she was not told that these problems would adversely affect her
partnership chances.

(Plaintiff's Findings 27-30)

Not only

does this assert i on conflict with the documentary evidence, it
also corroborates plaintiff's difficulties in the area of
interpersonal skills.
Fredric Laughlin made explicit reference to the
effect of this deficiency on her chances for admission in h is
1981 counseling notes as follows:

"While this is a very

difficult area in which to measure progress and ultimate
success, it is no less important for purposes of evaluation by
the partners for admission."

(Defendant's Exh. 11)

The effect

of plaintiff's interpersonal skills difficulties upon her
chances for admission were also noted in a performance
evaluation by Timothy Coffey:

"I suspect this is the one area

where Ann needs to show improvement to become a partner."
(Defendant's Exh. 25)

Furthermore, plaintiff wrote "agreed"

and her initials beside Coffey's comment, in addition to
signing the evaluation.

(Id. )

Plaintiff's assertion that no one ever told her
that these difficulties could affect her admission, in addition
to being inaccurate, itself corroborates her problems in this
area.

Inherent in this assertion is the suggestion that

plaintiff would have worked harder at interpersonal skills if
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she had known that it was important to her chances of
admission.

By negative implication, then, plaintiff would have

only been interested in improving her relations with others had
she known that it would affect her chances for admission.
Plaintiff's attitude strongly suggests that she did not
recognize the importance of interpersonal skills in performing
her duties as a Senior Manager.
3.

Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are
Corroborated By The Number Of Negative Comments.
As noted above, over half of the comments

concerning plaintiff's candidacy discussed deficiencies in the
area of interpersonal skills both in her dealings with partners
and staff.

The sheer number of such comments and the fact that

they came from partners in Price Waterhouse offices throughout
the country serve to corroborate plaintiff's deficiencies.
Plaintiff did not controvert the accuracy of their statements.
Indeed, she affirmatively supported the basis for these
comments by testifying that several partners received their
information concerning her relations with staff from the staff
itself.

(R. 126 & 131-32)

Plaintiff chooses instead to challenge the
limited contact that she had with some of these partners, which
they fully disclosed in their written comments.
Findings 51-52)

(Plaintiff's

The fact that she does not remember even

meeting some of these partners weakens rather than strengthens
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her case by pointing out her deficiencies in the area of
interpersonal skills.
4.

Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are
Corroborated By Her Supporters.
Plaintiff's deficiencies in the area of

interpersonal skills are further corroborated by her
supporters' written commentary on the long and short forms and
the discussions documented in the Admissions Committee office
visit memoranda.

(Defendant's

Exhs. 27, 30 & 31)

These

materials demonstrate that plaintiff's supporters recognized
her weaknesses in this area, but balanced them differently than
her detractors did in commenting in favor of her admission.
Furthermore, even those who did not comment upon her
interpersonal skills on the long and short forms confirmed such
deficiencies during the Admissions Committee's office visit to
0GS, and expressed doubts as to plaintiff's ability to change
in this respect.

(Defendant's Exh. 30)

Plaintiff has chosen

to characterize comments from supporters recognizing her
positive and negative characteristics as "damning with faint
praise," but the record shows that the descriptions of her
strengths cannot accurately be labeled "faint praise.
(Defendant's Exhs. 27, 30 & 31)
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5.

Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are
Corroborated By The Testimony Of The Price
Waterhouse Witnesses.
This conclusive documentary evidence concerning

plaintiff's interpersonal skills, especially in the area of
staff relations, is further bolstered by the testimony of
Thomas Beyer, Timothy Coffey, Barrett Boehm, and Donald
Epelbaum.

These four witnesses gave uncontroverted examples of

staff members in OGS and in the St. Louis office who described
their difficulties in working with plaintiff, and expressed the
sentiment that they did not want to work with plaintiff again.

(R. 192-97, 218, 344-45, 350, 353, 364-65, 386-87

&

390-91)

In

addition, Boehm described plaintiff's dealings with him on the
FmHA proposal as direct, abrupt, insensitive and demeaning.
(R.

363)
Plaintiff did not dispute at trial that the staff

members had made these statements .

Indeed, she confirmed

difficulties with them, and admitted that they had conveyed
these difficulties to the partners.

Having failed to question

these statements at trial, she now criticizes the fact that
Price Waterhouse did not present the testimony of staff members
other than Boehm at trial.

(Plaintiff's Findings 31 & 35)

The

fact that Price Waterhouse chose not to lengthen the trial by
duplicating undisputed testimony is hardly sufficient grounds
upon which to satisfy her burden of establishing pretext.
Plaintiff had ample opportunity to call these individuals as
adverse witnesses, had she wished to cross-examine them.
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Furthermore, Epelbaum testified credibly in
detail as to his own dealings with plaintiff that influenced
his input during the 1983 admissions cycle.

He found plaintiff

very talented and bright, and outstanding in oral and written
communications, but had some difficulties with her.

She was

combative and argumentative, used harsh terms, and barged into
his office without knocking.

He testified that she had called

some of his advice concerning interpersonal skills "stupid."

(R. 376, 377-78

& 380)

Plaintiff denied calling his advice stupid and
explained that she rarely uses the term "stupid," and would
more likely use a term such as "inappropriate."

(R. 705)

Such

testimony is hardly credible, coming from an individual who
testified that she often criticized the work product of others
as

II

all fucked up."

(R. 714; Hopkins Dep. at 94)

Furthermore,

plaintiff's testimony did not address whether she criticized
his advice using some other term.

Plaintiff's attempt to

somehow discredit Epelbaum's testimony by placing the advice a
year later in time, after the OGS decision not to repropose
her, should be discredited similarly.
6.

(R.

715)

Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Difficulties Are
Corroborated By The Testimony Of Her Rebuttal
Witnesses.
Plaintiff produced three witnesses to "rebut" the

overwhelming evidence that she had difficulties in her
relations with staff.

The first such witness, Karen Nold,
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testified that she would work with plaintiff again, but
admitted that plaintiff had a controver sial managemen t style,
and presented things as she saw them, sometimes not thinking
about the response of the other person.

(R. 420, 422 & 423)

Thus, Nold's testimony as to her personal reaction to plaintiff
hardly can be said to rebut the overwhelm ing evidence that
others had difficult ies in their dealings with her.
The other two "rebuttal" witnesses , Sandra Kinsey
and Harry Barschdor f, worked with plaintiff on the . REMS project
after the partners commented upon plaintiff 's 1983 candidacy ,
and their testimony does not purport to address her dealings
before that time.

(R. 425, 437)

Neverthel ess, Kinsey

corrobora ted the evidence as to plaintiff 's interperso nal
skills when she agreed that it was her view that working on a
routine basis with plaintiff required a lot of "diplomac y,
patience and guts."
7.

( R.

434)

The Testimony Of The State Departmen t Officials
Is Irrelevan t To The Issue Before This Court.
As part of her case in chief, plaintiff presented

the testimony of United States State Departmen t officials who
had been her clients, and asserts that their views are relevant
to the issue of pretext.

(Plaintif f's Finding 34)

Their

relationsh ips with plaintiff were never at issue in the
admission s process, and thus their testimony is irrelevan t to
this proceedin g.

Indeed, the fact that plaintiff was able to
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maintain good relations with her clients simply suggests that
she exercised interpersonal skills on a selective basis.
C.

The Commentary Concerning Plaintiff's Interpersonal
Skills Was Not Based On Her Sex.
The record before the Court is devoid of any direct

evidence, testimonial or documentary, of sex discrimination on
the part of the partners who commented negatively on her
candidacy.

Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that these

individuals were sex-neutral in their comments and in their
recommendations.

Plaintiff therefore relies on the speculative

testimony of her expert witness, Dr. Fiske, in order to attempt
to satisfy her burden of establishing pretext.
1.

Plaintiff Has Presented No Direct Evidence Of Sex
Discrimination On The Part Of Any Of Those Who
Commented Negatively Upon Her Candidacy.
Plaintiff has introduced no direct evidence to

attempt to show that any of the partners who commented
negatively did so because of her sex.

Indeed, plaintiff would

be hard-pressed to £ind support in the record for her
proposition that the negative comments were based on her sex.
These partners comment routinely, both positively and
negatively, concerning the interpersonal skills of male
candidates in the admissions process, and on occasion have made
identical negative comments about plaintiff and a male
candidate.

(Defendant's Exh. 74)
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Furthermore, many of these

partners have supported other female candidates.

(Defendant's

Exh. 63)
2.

Plaintiff's Argument That These Comments Were The
Result Of Sexual Stereotyping Is Pure Speculation.
Having failed to establish any direct evidence of

sex discrimination on the part of the commentors, plaintiff has
turned to an expert witness to provide a "conceptual framework"
for plaintiff's theory that she would have not received these
negative comments had she been a man.
57-62)

(Plaintiff's Findings

The testimony of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Fiske, cannot

suffice to advance this theory because her testimony had no
factual basis and was essentially circular.

In order to reach

the conclusion that the Price Waterhouse partners would not
have viewed plaintiff as negatively as they did had she been a
man, Dr . Fiske assumed, without any analysis of the partners
themselves or any in-depth study of the admissions process,
that each of them conformed to her male stereotype that has
different expections regarding the behavior of men and women.
(R.

547-48)
Dr. Fiske testified that the overall stereotype

of a woman is to be socially concerned and understanding and
that the stereotype of a man is to be competitive, ambitious,
independent and active.

(R. 547)

Based on a limited review of

the Admissions Committee materials concerning plaintiff, and a
small percentage of the other admissions materials that were
available to her,

(R. 596), Dr. Fiske concluded that the
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partners had reacted negatively to plaintiff because she
behaved in a manner incongruent with their expectations.
559 & 564)

(R.

Such a characterization of the Price Waterhouse

partners is itself a stereotype, which Dr. Fiske defined as "a
set of beliefs that are presumed to be true about a person on
the basis of categorizing them within any given social
category."

(R.

535-36)

Dr. Fiske admittedly presumed certain
characteristics to be true about the Price Waterhouse partners
without any factual inquiry, such as a comparison of their
comments about male candidates with their comments about
plaintiff.

(R. 593-95)

The record before the Court shows that

Price Waterhouse partners, including those who commented
concerning plaintiff, react negatively to male candidates who
are abrasive, overbearing and tough on staff.

Furthermore,

they comment positively upon male candidates who are personable
and sensitive to others, who exhibit social grace, and who have
good relations with their staff.

(Defendant's Exh. 68)

In support of her conclusion, Dr. Fiske cited
several indicators of stereotyping, including categorical
thinking, attention to stereotypic dimensions such as social
skills, selective perception, and intensely negative
evaluations.

(R. 557-60)

Her only example of categorical

thinking was on the part of Beyer, plaintiff's strongest
supporter.

(R. 554)

The record shows that the balance of

these conditions exist with respect to male and female
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candidates.

First, all candidates receive comments concerning

interpersonal skills, the so-called stereotypic dimension.
Second, the Admissions Committee materials display some
divergence of opinion concerning the interpersonal skills of
almost every candidate.

Third, extreme and intense comments,

both positive and negative, are the regular fodder of the
admissions process.

(Defendant's Exh. 68)

In short, the thrust of Dr. Fiske's testimony is
that subjecting plaintiff to the same process by which male
candidates, and those female candidates who conform to
Dr. Fiske's stereotype of what a Price Waterhouse partner
expects of a woman, are evaluated was somehow unfair.

This

hardly suffices to satisfy plaintiff's burden of establishing
that she was the victim of intentional sex discrimination.

The

testimony of Dr. Fiske is purely speculative and therefore must
be rejected.
D.

The Policy Board's Decision To Place Plaintiff On Hold
Was Not Based Upon Her Sex.
Faced with overwhelmingly negative commentary which

was both widespread and intense, the Admissions Committee truly
had only two options available with respect to plaintiff's 1983
candidacy:

to tell her that she would never be admitted to the

firm or to place her candidacy on hold.

The Admissions

Committee after several votes recommended the less drastic
option, and the Policy Board adopted this recommendation.
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Yet

plaintiff claims that she would have been admitted had she been
a man.

(Plaintiff's Finding 73)

There is simply no basis for

this claim.
1.

The Admissions Committee Regularly Cites
Interpersonal Skills In Its "Hold" And "No"
Decisions.
Price Waterhouse has introduced into evidence the

Admissions Committee materials concerning 31 male candidates
concerning whom the Admissions Committee recommended a "hold"
or a "no" decision, citing problems in interpersonal skills.
(Defendant's Exh. 64)

In addition, testimony by Donald Ziegler

and Roger Marcellin identified particular candidates whose
difficulties paralleled those of plaintiff.

(R.

268 & 314)

Plaintiff attempts to discredit this evidence by placing all of
these male candidates into two categories:
and "the young."

"the incompetent"

(Plaintiff's Findings 48-49)

Plaintiff takes great liberties with the factual
record in describing other candidates for admission as
incompetent or lackluster and in distinguishing herself from
these candidates because of her position "at or near the top"
of all candidates under consideration.
Finding 19)

(Plaintiff's

The only comparative records in evidence in fact

show otherwise - plaintiff was at the bottom of the MAS
candidates that year in scoring, and the number of "no"
recommendations that she received from partners was equaled or
exceeded only by two candidates, each of whom were told that
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..
they would never be admitted to the firm.
Exhs. 36 & 69)

(Defendant's

She apparently bases her claim on her proposal,

(Plaintiff's Finding 19), which by design addressed only those
qualities that caused the partners in OGS to propose her, and
upon the Admissions Committee memorandum, which borrowed
heavily from the proposal in order to justify recommending a
"hold" rather than a "no."

(R. 207, 312-13 & 381)

As to the other comparable candidates, plaintiff
distinguishes them as "the young," who were placed.on hold to
give them another year to mature.

(Plaintiff's Finding 49)

Such situations are quite analogous to that of plaintiff, but
plaintiff without elaboration claims that young males are not
similarly situated.

This is especially puzzling in light of

the fact that plaintiff had worked for Price Waterhouse a
relatively short time before her proposal and was therefore
"young" in terms of experience with Price Waterhouse when the
Admissions Committee reviewed her qualifications for admission.
2.

Plaintiff Was Not Similarly Situated With The Two
Candidates She Claims Were Admitted Despite
Concerns About Interpersonal Skills.
Of the over two hundred male candidates for

admission from 1982 through 1984, plaintiff has identified only
two candidates who she claims were admitted despite expressed
concerns about their interpersonal skills.
Finding 46)

(Plaintiff's

Although plaintiff argues that the Admissions

Committee practice of preparing explanatory memoranda only with
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respect to "hold" or "no" decisions hindered her search,
(Plaintiff's Finding 47), interpersonal skills concerns are
expressed in the first instance in the long and short forms,
which were available to plaintiff and summarized in one of
defendant's exhibits.

(Defendant's Exh. 68)

The record shows

that the two candidates that she identified were not similarly
situated to plaintiff with respect to either interpers9nal
skills difficulties or technical abilities.
Neither of these candidates received . the
widespread, intense and overwhelmingly negative long- and
short-form response received by plaintiff concerning
interpersonal skills.

Nevertherless, even much smaller numbers

of negative comments caused the Admissions Committee and the
Policy Board some concern, which further corroborates their
close examination of candidates in this area.

In each of these

cases, the balancing of the firm's immediate need for the
candidate's special and unique technical skills against some
clearly limited concerns about interpersonal skills resulted in
his admission.

Thus, plaintiff and these candidates were not

similarly situated.

(R. 276-77; Deposition of Joseph Connor

("Connor Dep.") at 34, 82-83 & 95-96; Defendant's Exhs. 73, 83
&

84)
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E.

Plaintiff's Statistical Studies Provide No Basis Fo r A
Finding Of Sex Discriminat io n On The Part Of The
Policy Board.
Plaintiff attempts to use statistical evidence to

prove that the reasons offered by the decisionmakers in this
case are pretextual.

Plaintiff's stat i stical exhibits purport

to examine (1) the average time for males and females to
advance to Manager;

(2) the rates at which male and female

Senior Managers were proposed for admission; and (3) the
numbers of males and females admitted to the firm.

These

statistics, however, do not address the treatment of females by
the decisionmaking partners herein.

More particularly,

plaintiff's statistics do not focus upon those partners '
historical treatment of female and male Senior Managers in
considering whether to propose them for partnership and in
commenting upon or disposing of their candidacies . fl_/

Because

of this lack of focus , plaintiff's statistical exhibits are of
no probative value in determining the intent or motive of the
decisionmakers in this case .

See Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746,

750 (2d Cir. 1984); Smithers v . Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 899 (3d
Cir. 1980).

Cf.

Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S .

567, 580 (1978); Davis v . Litton Bionetics, Inc., 444 F. Supp .
638, 646 (D . Md . 1978).

~/ One study does not even focus on the kinds of decisions at
issue, much less the operative decisionmakers.
(Plaintiff's
Exh. 38(c)) Another is without focus upon the relevant time
period herein .
(Plaintiff's Exh . 38(a)) See Lehman v. Trout,
104 S. Ct . 1404 (1984).
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The absence of an appropriate focus is not the
only reason to reject the plaintiff's statistical evidence.
The studies fail to take into account the most obvious and
legitimate characteristics or qualifications which affect the
time it takes to advance to Manager, the likelihood of being
proposed for partnership in a given year and the likelihood of
being admitted to the firm.

These defects are substantial and

they bias the results of plaintiff's studies.
1.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) Is Not Probative
Concerning Partnership Admission Decisions.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) appears to be a study

of the treatment of females by the firm in its decisions
concerning admission to partnership.

The study effectively

compares female representation in the 1984 snapshot of the
partnership (7 of 662) and an unspecified female availability
throughout the over 25-year period when the decisions were made
to admit these partners.

Plaintiff appears to contend that the

female percentage of those "available'' during this 25-year
period was substantially higher than their representation in
the 1984 partnership snapshot.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) fails to focus upon the
proper pool of those available to be admitted.

This is the

group of those Senior Managers who have been proposed by their
local offices for admission to the firm.

Attaining Senior

Manager status and being proposed by one's local office are the
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minimum basic qualifications to be eligible for a firm decision
as to admission for partnership.

See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d

1249, 1274-77, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 660 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2794 (1984).

Since plaintiff has

failed to account for these qualifications, the exhibit should
not be considered probative as to the firm's treatment of
females available for admission.
The fact is that the only liability period study
of the firm's partnership decisions, much less the only study
using the proper availability pool, is Defendant's Exhibit 77.
Exhibit 77 demonstrates that females were treated no
differently than males in partnership decisions from 1979
through 1984.

Plaintiff's expert admitted to having reviewed

well before trial the statistics set forth in Defendant's
Exhibit 77 and being instructed by counsel not to take account
of them in his conclusions.

(R. 520-21)

Instead he invented

Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(a) to achieve results purporting to
support plaintiff's allegations.

At trial, he tried to dismiss

Defendant's Exhibit 77 as involving numbers of available
females too small to support any statistical conclusion,

(R. 521-24), this despite his use of numbers in the same
magnitude or size to support his conclusions in Plaintiff's
Exhibit 38(b).

(If the statistics in Defendant's Exhibit 77

are indeed too small to draw a conclusion, then by definition
they are too small to support an inference of discrimination in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b).)
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2.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b) Is Based Upon Erroneous
Assumptions.
Plaintiff offered Exhibit 38(b) as a study of

whether females suffered discrimination in the decisions to
propose Senior Managers for partnership.

The exhibit and the

conclusions plaintiff seeks to have drawn are based upon
several erroneous assumptions.
First, Exhibit 38(b) assumes that because
administrative Managers can be proposed for partners, they are
as likely to be proposed in any given year as professional
Managers.

The evidence directly contradicts this assumption of

equal qualifications or an equal likelihood of being proposed
for administrative and professional Managers .

(Not a single

administrative Manager was proposed from 1981-1985.)

The

evidence also demonstrates that when the male and female
administrative Managers are excluded from plaintiff's analysis,
the differences between male and female professional Managers'
proposal rates under plaintiff's own method of study are not
statistically significant.

(R.

637)

Another significant error in Plaintiff's
Exhibit 38(b) is that in calculating the expected number of
female proposals in each given year, less experienced Managers
are considered equally likely to be proposed as the more
experienced Managers.

The evidence demonstrates this

assumption to be in error and that the assumption causes female
availability to be overstated.

The overstatement occurs
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because the female representation in the Manager ranks is
growing in real numbers and percentage terms each year.
637-40)

(R.

The result is that proportionately more of the female

Managers in any given year are in the less-experienced range.
For example, in the 1982 proposals 58 percent of the females
were new entrants to plaintiff's five-year availability
grouping whereas 49 percent of the males were new.

In 1983 the

percentages were 65 percent female and 46 percent male.
Interestingly, plaintiff's expert has in other
cases regularly taken into account differences in the length of
experience or tenure in trying to predict the treatment of
males and females.

For example, in Bazemore v. Friday, 751

F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1984), he sought to predict salaries with a
regression using length of job tenure as an explanatory
variable.

Common sense and the empirical data in this case

tells us that differences in the length of experience are also
predictive of the likelihood of being proposed.

Plaintiff's

expert chose to ignore them and thus to inflate female
"availability."
Defendant's Exhibit 87 illustrates the effect of
plaintiff's erroneous assumption.

In this exhibit proposal

rates are calculated for males from each contract year "class"
(i.e., each level of experience) for each year.

An expected

number of female proposals from the same class is then
determined by using the actual male proposal rate for that
class and multiplying it times the number of females in that
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same class.

The results reflect a "shortfall" of about 3

females in 1983 and about 2 females in 1984.
Perhaps an even more serious problem with
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b) is that it assumes a ll proposals are
made by the same decisionmakers picking from a single pool of
all Senior Managers.
obviously knows it.

This is not the case and pl a intiff
Even taking the disparities between the

expected female and the actual female proposal rates in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(b), plaintiff's expert could shed no
light on which local office partners had engaged in the
supposed discrimination.
could not have.

He certainly did not cite OGS and

There is no allegation that any other female

in OGS has not been proposed or forecast for proposal when she
should have.

Had this happened, plaintiff certainly would have

been aware and would have raised it.
3.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) Is Based on Erroneous
Assumptions.
Plaintiff offered Exhibit 38(c) as evidence that

it took females hired in some years significantly longer to
advance to Manager than males hired in those same years.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) assumes that the females hired below
the Manager level entered the firm on average at the same level
as males hired below the Manager level and thus that the
females should have progressed to Manager in the same average
time as the males.

This assumption was directly contradicted
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by the evidence concerning hiring patterns which show males on
average entered the firm at a higher level below the Manager
rank.

(Defendant's Exhs. 70, 85 & 86)

Plaintiff's erroneous

assumption biased the results of her study and fails to comport
with known factual realities.

(R. 631-35; see Pegues v.

Mississippi St. Emp. Service, 699 F.2d 760, 770 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 482 (1983)

(Dr. Mann's study rejected

for failure to account for experience differences))
Even ignoring the serious failure to . account for
legitimate differences in the average experience and
qualifications of the male and female groups, plaintiff's study
results are of no relevance to the conduct at issue herein nor
to the assessment of the motive of the decisionmakers herein.
That is, Plaintiff's Exhibit 38(c) addresses the discrete
decisions by each group of local office partners to advance
persons to the Manager status by lumping all the decisions
together as if made by the same decisionmakers from single
firmwide pool.

Even ignoring the failure of Exhibit 38(c) to

account for basic qualifications, the disparities reported
therein cannot be attributed to any particular group of local
office partners and particularly the 0GS partners.

They also

do not speak to the treatment of female Senior Managers.
4.

Plaintiff's Statistical Studies Have No Probative
Value .
Briefly, plaintiff's statistical exhibits and

their results or conclusions are founded on erroneous
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assumptions.

The exhibits do not employ models which fit

factual realities.

The exhibits fail to address the actions or

practices of the decisionmakers involved in this case.

While

the Supreme Court has held that statistical evidence can be of
some limited probative value as to the motive issue in an
individual disparate treatment case, the statistics here are so
flawed and unfocused as to have no probative value.

Cf. Furnco

Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580.
To the extent that statistics have been offered
that are relevant to the overall trends and policies in the
firm concerning the treatment of female professionals, they are
found in Defendant's Exhibits 70, 85 and 86.fl/

These

statistics reflect a steady, persistent and substantial
increase in the female population and representation
percentages at all levels of the firm's workforce.

In Pouncy

3/ In late January 1985, plaintiff made a discovery request of
Price Waterhouse for certain limited statistical information .
Price Waterhouse timely supplied plaintiff in February with a
computer tape containing all of the information plaintiff that
requested.
Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference plaintiff
disclosed for the first time her statistical contentions and
exhibits. With this last-minute introduction of unfocused and
flawed studies, plaintiff now suggests that the defendant has
the burden of proof on statistical matters and should have in
the week before trial generated studies precisely demonstrating
the effect of failing to take into account the kinds of factors
which plaintiff's expert admits he would like to have
considered (but plaintiff never requested).
(Plaintiff's
Finding 40) This approach to statistical proofs suggests that
plaintiff believes that defendant has the burden of proof in
this case.
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v. Prudential I n surance Co., 668 F.2d 795, 804 (5th Cir. 1982),
the court affirmed a finding that stat i stics reflecting a
"gradual but steady increase in the percentages of black
employees in all levels" of the workforce were "inconsistent
with any policy of discrimination."

See EEOC v. Hartford Fire

Ins. Co., 31 FEP Cases 531 (D. Conn. 1983); Lewis v. Bloomsburg
Mills, Inc . , 30 FEP Cases 1715, 1729 (D.S.C. 1982~
F.

Plaintiff's Reference To Counseling Concerning
Grooming And Appearance Is A Red Herring.
Plaintiff attempts to infuse her case with some hint

of sex discrimination by emphasizing counseling she purportedly
received concerning her grooming and personal appearance.
(Plaintiff's Finding 53(c))
for a number of reasons.

This counseling is a red herring

First, these suggestions came from

her supporters, and there is no evidence of such concerns on
the part of her detractors.

Second, there is absolutely no

indication that the Policy Board based its decision on such
considerations.

Third, male employees are counseled on such

matters as well,

(Connor Dep. at 21-22), and therefore such

counseling cannot be challenged as sex discrimination.

See

Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
Thus, any such counseling is irrelevant to the issues before
this Court.
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II. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons Articulated
By Price Waterhouse For the OGS Decision Were
Pretextual.
The decision of the OGS partners not to propose
plaintiff for admission to the firm the next year was based
upon concerns about plaintiff's interpersonal skills and
management skills.

Two partners expressed strong opposition

and the OGS partners, who were well aware of the reasons
underlying the Policy Board's hold decision, voted 13 to 2
against proposing her that year.

During the deliberations,

which took place over several hours, none of the other 11
partners who opposed her proposal, and neither of those in
favor of the proposal, suggested that these concerns had no
basis.

Instead, the remarks by other partners confirmed rather

than challenged these two partners' concerns.
Thus, Price Waterhouse has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the OGS decision through the
introduction of the testimony of Thomas Beyer and Donald
Epelbaum, Beyer's handwritten notes of the OGS deliberations,
and Beyer's letter informing Joseph Connor of the decision .
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating
that the articulated reasons are pretextual, and accordingly
has failed to satisfy her ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she was the victim of intentional discrimination on
the basis of sex.

Price Waterhouse therefore is entitled to

judgment in its favor concerning this decision.
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A.

The Actions Of Partners Outside OGS Are Not Relevant
To This Inquiry.
Plaintiff has injected yet more irrelevant matte :: s

into her challenge of the OGS decision, by introducing the
actions of partners outside OGS as purported evidence of
pretext on the part of the OGS partners.

First, she notes that

other 1983 candidates who were placed on hold were reproposed
by their h cal offices for admission in 1984.
Finding 64)

(Plaintiff's

The decisionmakers in these offices were not those

who decided not to propose plaintiff and therefore no proper
comparisons can be drawn.
Second, she points to representations by Paul Goodstat
and Joseph Connor about involving plaintiff in new projects.
(Plaintiff's Finding 65)

Even if the failure to follow through

with these intentions was based upon plaintiff's sex, their
actions were wholly unrelated to the OGS decision, and
therefore are not probative as to the issue of pretext on the
part of the OGS partners.

B.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That The Reasons
Underlying The OGS Decision Were Pretextual.
The only issue concerning the OGS decision not to

propose plaintiff the next year is whether the articulated
reasons are pretextual.

Plaintiff however has not introduced

any evidence that the OGS partners' response to certain
expressed concerns was pretextual, and has focused her attack
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instead on the alleged pretextual nature of the serious
concerns expressed by two OGS partners, Benton Warder and
Donald Epelbaum.

(Plaintiff's Findings 67-70)

Plaintiff would indeed be hard-pressed to find
evidence of sex discrimination by the OGS partners as a group.
Females represent a higher percentage of the Managers and
Senior Managers in OGS than in the firm overall.

Further, the

OGS partners proposed plaintiff for admission only a year
earlier (after including her in the forecast for admission as
early as 1980), and forecast the admission of five female OGS
(Defendant's Exhs. 8,

Senior Managers from 1985 through 1987.
12, 20, 65, 66, 67 & 70)

Finally, the testimony of Sandra

Kinsey, a nine-year employee of OGS, attests to the equal
opportunities for females at OGS.
C.

(R.

435-36)

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That Warder's Concerns
Were Pretextual.
Benton Warder opposed plaintiff's proposal for

admission in 1984 because of continued concerns about her
interpersonal skills and new concerns about her management of
the REMS project.

Plaintiff cites three bases upon which she

claims that his concerns were based on her sex:
recommendation as to her 1983 candidacy;

(1) his "hold"

(2) his review of the

REMS project; and (3) allegedly sex-based comments,
(Plaintiff's Finding 68), but falls far short of establishing
that Warder's concerns were pretextual.
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Plaintiff testified at trial and at her deposition
that her relations with Warder on the FMS project were not
good, admitting that she had been difficult to work with and
had behaved like a "bitch.

11

(R. 107-08; Hopkins Dep. at 74)

Warder was eventually removed as project partner, and plaintiff
believes that he attributes his removal, and the resulting
financial and professional losses, to her.
74-75)

(Hopkins Dep. at

In light of their prior dealings, it is hardly

surprising that Warder would recommend during the 1983
admissions cycle that she be "held," at the same time
recognizing her "major contribution to the firm."

(Defendant's

Exh. 27)
The REMS review, which plaintiff described in her
testimony merely as "hostile," is now termed "evidently
pretextual,

11

although there is no evidence upon which to base

this conclusion.

Indeed, plaintiff admitted that the project

had been found technically deficient in a subsequent quality
control review.

(R. 114)

Furthermore, Warder had absolutely

no incentive to pretextually criticize a project for which the
Partner in Charge of the office served as project partner,
especially in light of Warder's previous removal from the FMS
project.
Even if Warder's long-form comments and review of the
REMS project were motivated by some personal grudge against
plaintiff, she has failed to link them in any way to her sex.
The so-called "sex-based" comments made by Warder in other
contexts do not suffice to provide such a link.
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Plaintiff

'

. ,,

"

testified that Warder criticized her for talking like a
truckdriver,

(R. 120), but produced no evidence that he accepts

such language in male professionals at Price Waterhouse.
Finally, Warder's statement to Nold after plaintiff left the
firm that two children might be "a little too much" for a
working woman,

(R. 421), simply does not demonstrate that

plaintiff's sex played any part in his opposition to her
candidacy.
D.

Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated That Epelbaum's
Concerns Were Pretextual.
Following his transfer to 0GS in 1982, Donald Epelbaum

initially supported plaintiff's admission to the firm.
(Defendant's Exh. 27)

He immediately recognized her strengths,

counseled her concerning her weaknesses, especially in the area
of interpersonal skills, and candidly discussed both in his
long-form comments.

(R. 376-80)

By the time of Roger

Marcellin's visit to 0GS, Epelbaum's support had begun to
erode, based upon his uncontroverted discussions with staff
members in both 0GS and the St. Louis office who did not want
to work with plaintiff again and upon his own dealings with
plaintiff.

(R. 386-87)

This support had turned to opposition

by the time the 0GS partners met to consider whether to propose
plaintiff the next year, based on his further dealings with
her.

(R. 387-89)
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of

establishing that Epelbaum's concerns were pretextual.
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Indeed,

'

J

' J

,>

his progression from support to opposition suggests just the
opposite -- a sexist would more likely oppose a woman
throughout.

Epelbaum also had an obvious incentive not to

oppose plaintiff's candidacy in the face of strong support by
Beyer, the Partner in Charge of OGS.

(R. 217)

Plaintiff did not controvert any of Epelbaum's
testimony concerning his discussions with staff members.
Instead, plaintiff flatly denied Epelbaum's version of their
dealings, but yet did not provide her own version.
707-08 & 708-09).

(R . 704-05;

This is especially surprising in light of

her alleged ability to recall, word-for-word, discussions with
Connor, Beyer, Krulwich, Coffey, Warder, and MacVeagh.
~ , R. 38, 81, 87-88, 89-96, 99, 101, 105 & 106-10)

(See,
In

addition, her inconsistent testimony concerning her relations
with others, discussed supra, raises serious questions as to
her credibility.

Epelbaum is clearly the more credible witness

on these matters, and thus plaintiff has failed to carry her
burden of proving pretext on the part of Epelbaum.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has failed
to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that she was the victim
of intentional sex discrimination.

The requisite proof

required to satisfy this burden cannot be based on wholly
unfounded suspicion, nor can all inferences be drawn in
plaintiff's favor merely because she is female where there is
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credible proof counteracting the inferences urged by
plaintiff.

Butler v. Young, No. 83-0715, slip op. at 9

(D.D.C., Dec. 27, 1984).

The Court therefore should enter

judgment in favor of Price Waterhouse in this action.
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